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HOI'S
ABSTRACT
This paper presents an experimental study of the objective
formulation and policy aspects of strategic decision making, using
business gaming as a research tool. Specifically, the study
attempts to explore the objective formulation and consistency
issues of group decision making in a dynamic environment. Using
multi-dimensional objective functions and a fixed performance
scoring rule, certain quantitacive indices are obtained for measuring
differences in objective settings (focussed vs diverse) , as well
as the consistency between objectives and performance results.
Results from this study indicate that: i) Teams with
focussed objectives tended to have better performance than teams
with diverse objectives. The teams with focussed objectives also
evolved more top-down decision making organizational structure,
but with considerations of fewer alternatives. ii) The successful
teams also showed greater consistency between their performance
results and the objectives that they had emphasized. iii) However,
the requiirement for formal planning and policy statements produced
no significant differences in team performance although the planning
and policy forms were perceived by the game participants as something
potentially very useful. Instead, it is found here that proper
implementation was probably a more governing factor thaii the content
of planning. iv) No significant differences were observed in the
general results obtained from masters student groups and business
executive groups.
In summary, the limited evidence that we have obtained
in this study seems to suggest that organizational decision making
might well be more limited by the issues of objective formulation,
coordination and consistency, than by the inability to recognize
better opportunities or other alternatives.
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INTRODUCTION
This paper presents an experimental study of the objective
formulation and policy aspects of strategic decision making using business
gaming as a research vehicle. The research issues of interest here are
to investigate how differences in objective settings might affect
decision making and performance results, and to obtain some empirical
data about how performance results might be related to consistency
in the pursuance of established objectives. Given the current lack
of adequate definitions in research on policy and planning, and the
difficulty of attempting to evaluate process variables as well as
measuring outcomes in complex organizational decision making, the
essential aim of this paper is to clarify several central concepts
and to present results that can be replicable and extensible.
The fundamental view generally assumed in the normative
or prescriptive framework of planning and strategic decision making
is that the quality of decision making will be improved by concep-
tualizing the decision making process in more explicit terms, by
formulating concrete goals and objectives, by exploring the implica-
tions of subjective beliefs and objective data via the use of more
formal analytical and evaluative techniques, and by elaborating
assvunptions and tracking performance. Proponents of formal planning
systems thus place the emphasis on examining and extending the
'bounded rationality' (March and Simon, 1958) of executive decision
making (e.g. Ackoff 1970, Emery 1967, Reising, 1972). On the other
hand, the "intuitionalists" argue for more diagnostic skills and judge-
ments rather than for more foinnal structure in strategic planning.

- 2 -
This latter view of the planning process is held by many writers in
political science (e.g. Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1970), as well as
by business managers (e.g. Hall, 1973). A major difference between
the two views is the relative emphasis on the coordination and
consistency issues of decision making. From the organizational
decision making point of view, formal planning and policy establish-
ment probably imposes greater constraints and structure in the
organizational search of alternatives, facilitates the decision
making process, and thus enhances greater consistency in decision
making. On the other hand, greater diagnostic skills and more
flexible organizational structure (and informational flow) probably
enhance the organization's awareness of new opportunities in the
environment but run the risk of inconsistencies in decision making
and poor organizational coordination.
Before we can hope to settle the pros and cons of this
debate in its larger organizational-political context, we need to
explore certain basic issues about group decision making in a complex
dynamic environment. For example, to what extent are people limited
by their cognitive capacity such that it might be better for them to
adopt more focussed objectives than more diverse objectives? And,
is it as Bowman (1963) has suggested, that managers might not always
be consistent in their decisions? And, if so, do inconsistencies in
decision making often lead to poor performance results?
In the final analysis, the questions are, of course,
empirical ones. Yet there seems to be little chance of answering
these questions in the organizational world where managers are typically
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evaluated by the results, rather than by the quality of their decisions.
As Chester Barnard (1938) wrote some time ago:
" Not the least of the difficulties of
appraising the executive functions on the
relative merits of executives lies in the
fact that there is little direct opportunity
to observe the essential operation of decision."
Further, immense methodological problems in measuring the quality
of the decision process and in factoring out environmental factors
obscure the answers to these questions.
Because of these problems, research on managerial deci-
sion making and planning has tended to be either field-study oriented
with a general lack of specific theory testing; or, alternatively,
laboratory based but with usually simple and artificial task invol-
vements. In the present study, we suggest that simulation gaining may
provide a valuable middle ground for observation and theory testing.
Simulation games, albeit not without their limitations, do provide a
dynamic environment and a meaningful task that can generate great
enthusiasm among the participants, as well as situations that capture
many of the essential characteristics of real world strategic deci-
sion making. The use of simulation gaming for research purposes is
not new (e.g. Cangelosi & Dill 1962, Cohen et. al. 1964) . However,
much of the attention so far has only focussed on the operational areas
of decision making and with emphasis on performance results alone
rather than the quality of decision inputs. In general, the probing
of the policy and planning issues (i.e. the integrative aspects) of
organizational decision making is still a largely unexplored area.

- 4 -
In this study, we use a general management game to explore
how teams set objectives and translate them into strategic and opera-
tional decisions. By allowing each competing team certain flexibili-
ties to establish its own relative weightings on a given set of objec-
tives, and by using a fixed multi-dimensional performance scoring
rule similar to those of Vance and Gray (1967) and Hand and Sims (1975)
we obtain some quantitative measures of 'objective diversity' as well
as ' consistency
' between objective (rankings) and performance results.
With these measurement indices, we are interested in comparing the
consequences on organizational decision making and performance results
for teams who have set 'focussed' objectives vis-a-vis teams who
have set 'diverse' objectives. We are also interested in investigating
whether the higher performance teams might exhibit greater consistency
between objectives established and performance results.
The data in this study were collected from four separate
game offerings, involving two groups of masters students, and two
groups of business executives. In two groups (one masters group and
one executives group) , formal planning and policy statements were
also required. This four group experimental design thus also attempts
to investigate the possible effects of group characteristics and the
imposition of formal planning on team performances.
An additional motivation for this research study lies
in viewing it as an educational experiment with management games. From
the pedagogical point of view, the objective of general management games
(as opposed to functional games) is not just to teach technical skills.
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but also to develcff) the general decision making abilitj.es of the
participants. Unfortunately, there often is a lack of emphasis on
the integrative aspects of organizational decision making, i.e. the
policy and planning issues in business gaming. As Forrester (1961)
has criticized, management games often emphasize external, short-
term crises, intuition and period-to-period decisions, rather than
"the long-range planning of policies and organizations to avoid crisis".
The difficulty on the other hand is, of course, on how
to develop methodologies or approaches in analyzing the quality of
decision inputs as well as performance results. Much debate has centered
around this issue of game performance evaluation (e.g. Meurs & Choffray
1973) . Several investigations have found multi-dimensional performance
scores to be more reliable measures than single performance scores
(e.g. Vance & Gray 1967, Hand & Sims 1975). The present study attempts
to relate a multi-dimensional performance scoring rule to the objectives
established by the teams. The objective formulation and consistency
issues can then be used as a basis for providing feedback to the game
participants concerning their organizational decision inputs, i.e.
the strategies they chose to adopt, the operational decisions they made,
and the planning and policy questions at large. The study itself
thus serves as an educational experiment to explore the possibilities
of integrating the teaching of plainning and policy into business games.

- 6 -
II. Description of the M.I.T. Management Game and Game Administration
A. Game Structure
The M.I.T. Management Game* is a complex corporate
computer simulation game that incorporates various functional
aspects of management: i.e. marketing, production, and finance.
Teams compete in an oligopolistic industrial environment and
market one product in two different geographical markets, domestic
and foreign. Price, advertising elasticities, and effectiveness
of product development vary according to geographical area, con-
sumer income level, seasonal demands, customer loyalty etc.
Production is centralized, and shipment of products between geo-
graphical areas is permittad with the incurrence of shipping and
tariff charges. Lead time is required to increase inventory and
to expand production capacities. The financial functions involve
cash management, funds transfer to and from foreign operation,
debt financing for capital investments, dividend decisions, and
issuance or re-purchase of common stocks.
Each team takes over an essentially identical firm at
the beginning of the game and runs the firm for eight additional
quarters (with heavy seasonal demands in the 4th and the 8th
Quarter) . Each team inputs a set of decisions that includes pro-
duct development, marketing, production, capacity expansion,
and financing for each quarter and receives a set of five operating
reports for the firm from the computer simulation that includes
(i) balance sheet statement, (ii) profit and loss statement, (iii)
reconciliation of retained earnings, (iv) sources and uses of
*The M.I.T. Management Game was originally designed by David N. Ness
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funds statement, (v) inventory reconcilation. In addition each
team also receives a common market summary statement that contains
noise errors regarding the relative performaince of all firms.
B. Performance Scoring Rule
In the administration of the M.I.T. Management Game,
we have adopted a composite game performance score incorporating weighted
values of several different objectives. The method is similar to those
used by Vance and Gray (1967) and Hands and Sims (1975) . The multi-
dimensional score has several advantages over the use of single
criterion (such as profitability only) which would be more subject
to chance fluctuation and artificial manipulation. It is also more
realistic in that managers of business firms tend to have multiple
goals rather than just profit maximization (Panpandreous 1952, Cyert
and March 1962). Within the game context, multi-dimensional performance
evaluators reduce feedback ambiguities and give a better understanding
of the cause and effect relationship between decisions and outcomes in
the simulation environment and game dynamics.
The composite game performance score is calculated as
follows: At the beginning of the game, a set of objectives (financial
measures similar to those used by security analysts) is given to the
participcints ; for example, return on asset (ROA) , net earnings (NE) ,
market value (MV) , market share (MS), and earnings per share (EPS).
The objective measures might also be specified either as average values
over several quarters, or as the value at the end period of the game.
(Different sets of objectives were used in different game offerings)
.
Each team is then asked to assign a weight to each objective such
that the weights add to a total of 20 points, but with a limit on the
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maximvun and minimum number of points allowed for each objective (e.g.
8 and 2). During the initial two or three periods of the game, teams
may also change the weights if they wish. At the end of the game,
the teams' performances are ranked according to their relative perform-
ances on each objective and points are awarded accordingly. If 6 teams
compete during the game, 6 points are awarded to the team ranked first,
5 points to the team ranked second, and so forth. The total score for
each team is obtained by multiplying, for each objective, the points
awarded based on the rankings times the weighted value assigned by the
team, and summing over all objectives. (See Table 1 for sample
calculation.) The team with the highest total points wins the game.
Objectives Ranking Points Awarded Wts. Assigned by Actual
Achieved Based on Rank- X Team to Objec- = Points
ing Achieved tives
MV
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C. Rationale for Performance Rule
The rationale for adopting the above performance scoring
rule is twofold. On the one hand, we want to have a common basis of
performance evaluation for all teams. On the other, we want a scoring
procedure which is also flexible enough to induce a 'management by
objective' philosophy for the game participants. This (limited) flexibility
to decide on their preferences on objectives is important because
it renders the evaluation rule more realistic and meaningful. Moreover, it
provides an effective focal point for the game participants to center
their organizational learning during the early phase of the game competition.
As the set of objectives are not always complementary,
(e.g. stress on high profit margin will probably put a compressing force
upon its market share, or accentuating high dividends may put a
squeeze on cash reserve for financing capital investments) , it is
necessary for the teams to go through some analysis in the first two or
three moves of the game. For the purpose of further exposition of the essen-
tial nature of the strategic planning and decision making processes involved
in this gaming competition, we might conceptualize (somewhat idealistically)
the team's decision making process to proceed as follows:
Initially, based on their preferences and learning goals, the team
members set up some tentative weightings on the given set of objectives.
Thus, where they prefer to run a growth oriented firm, they might assign
the highest weights to return on asset (ROA) and market value (MV) . Or,
if the team members desire to run an aggressive firm and become the
product leader, they might stress the weightings on market share (MS)
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and net earnings (NE) . The team members have to think through the
implications of these objectives in order to evolve some sort of over-
all policy and strategy. In this initial learning phase of the game
(first two or three moves), a large part of the team's effort would
be spent on understanding the environment, thinking about and estimating
the interrelationship between decision variables and performance
indices (e.g. how R&D expenditure and advertising affect demand, how
price affects sales etc.), as well as on the organizational development
aspects of responsibility allocation and coordination. During this
initial organizational learning phase, the team might also modify the
relative weights on the objectives. The final set of objectives
chosen should then provide the direction for the firm and serve as the
basis for strategy formulation during the rest of the game competition.
In general, the context of the M.I.T. Management Game
has been found to be rich enough to allow different types of strategic
planning for the teams; i.e. the different emphases in the set of objectives,
and the different market factors they can choose to exploit, (for example,
geographic market factor, shoppers vs loyal customers, and the effect of
seasonality). The game had been used previously for several years in
different teaching programs of the school and has been found to be fairly
'robust' in that geime participants have in general regarded the simulation
results to be realistic. (Marcotte 1974) Teams have also been able to
succeed using a variety of strategies. As a matter of fact, given that
the market structure is an obligopoly and that there are usually
economic slacks in the system (simply by capitalizing on other teams' errors).
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there is really no strong reason, a priori, why teams should adopt a
specific strategy since they can always try to exploit the current
opportunities of the market. The emphasis (and caution) we wish to
place here (since it would affect directly the validity of our results
in this study) is that our primary interest is on the cognitive aspects
of team decision making (i.e. the objective setting and the consistency
issues) and how they affect performance results. We want to be
reasonably confident that the specific gaming environment chosen is
general enough that the teams' performance results are not dominated
by any artifact of the simulation gaming structure.
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III . Research Design
A. Data Collection
The present study involved observations and data collec-
tion over four separate offerings of the M.I.T. Management Game.
This allowed for control on two possible extraneous variables
—
group composition and requirement of formal planning. During two
offerings, the game participants were students in the one year
accelerated master's program in management at M.I.T. , hereafter
designated as AGP I and AGP II (for Accelerated Graduate Program
I and II). During the other two offerings, the participants were
business executives who were enrolled in a 9 week management devel-
opment program at M.I.T., hereafter designated as SEP I and SEP II
(for Senior Executive Program I and II) . Each group consisted of
28-35 students and was divided into six teams with 4-6 people on
each team. The team assignment procedure was essentially random
except that each team must include at least one member who had had
some technical background in computers and quantitative analysis.
Principal differences in group characteristics between the
AGP students and the Senior Executives may be summarized as follows:
The average age for AGP students was about 28, and they all had
some full-time work experience. The participants in the SEP's typ-
ically hold high management positions in their sponsoring organi-
zations. Their average age was about 45 and all had solid business
experience
.
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The second experimental variable to be controlled is the
incorporation of formal planning and policy statements in the management
game. In the two groups, AGP and SEP 1, only forecasting forms were
required from the teams. For the other two groups (AGP II and SEP II)
,
the teams were also required to give explicit policy and planning state-
ments. The Planning aind Policy Forms (See Appendix 3) were designed
basically to probe the planning assumptions and to induce the teams
to formulate more explicit strategy and policy.
An additional question relevant to the present investi-
gation is the perceived usefulness of the Planning and Policy State-
ments by the participants. Two slightly different questionnaires were
given to the two AGP groups at the end of the game. The first
questionnaire (Appendix 1) was given to students in AGP I, who did
not have the planning and Policy forms during the course of the game.
The second questionnaire (Appendix 2) was given to students in
AGP II who had used the forms during the game play.
In summary, the data collection in this study is based
on a four group experimental design as shown in Table 2. The comparison
of AGP groups with SEP groups contrasts the differences that might
be due to group characteristics. The requirement on the second groups
to have explicit policy formulation and assumption statements contrasts
any differences between Groups I and II' s stemming from the formal
planning requirements.
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Table 2. Experimental Design
Masters Students Business Executives
Plemning with only
i
forecasting required
AGP I SEP I
Planning with fore-
j casting and explicit
f
I
policy formulation
AGP II SEP II
B. Measurement
i) Index of diversity in objective formulation
As explained above, the competing teams were allowed to
set their own relative weights on a given set of objectives. For
the purpose of analysis, we will define a team that assigned the
maximum allowable weights on some objectives and minimum weights
on the others as having adopted the 'most focussed' objectives; or
conversely, a team that chose to spread out the weights equally
over all objectives will be defined as having adopted the 'most
diverse' objectives. An index of objective diversity (d) is then
calculated as follows: First, rank order the weights on objectives.
Then, take the absolute differences (pairwise) between the weights
assigned to each objective and weights that would be assigned to
each corresponding objective on a 'most focussed' basis. Sum these
differences over all objectives. The number is then divided
(normalized) by the sum of differences between the 'most focussed'
and the 'most diverse' objectives.
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As an example, consider a team that has assigned the
following weights to a set of objectives: MV=6, R0A=2 , MS=4,
EPS=5, NI=3; d is computed to equal .5 as shown in Table 3. It
should be noted that in general, d has a range of values from
to 1, with d=0 for the teams having the 'most focussed' objectives
and d=l for the teams having the 'most diverse' objectives.12 3
Objectives Actual Weights Most focussed Most Diverse Diff- Diff-
Assigned Weights Wt. Assign- erence erence
Assignment ment \l - 2' !2 - 3,'
MV
EPS
MS
NI
ROA
6
5
4
3
2
8
6
2
2
2
4
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ii) Index of consistency between performance results and objectives
Another measure of interest in this study is the consistency
between a team's performance results and the objectives set. If a team
places the heaviest weight on market share (MS) , the results would be
consistent if the team also achieves the best (relative) results in MS
and similarly for the other objectives as well. Thus, a measure of
consistency between performance results and objectives can be obtained
by considering their rank order correlation. The index of consistency
(c) is defined here by using the Kendall's Tau rank order correlation
coefficient between the two variables. This index has a value ranging
from -1 to 1, with the value 1 implying perfect consistency, -1 implying
perfect inconsistency, and implying no correlation,
iii) Alternative Measure of Performance
In this study, the major dependent variable of interest is
performance as defined by the multi-dimensional scoring rule. In order
to verify that any statistically significant results obtained would not
be due to possible biases introduced by this rank ordered and weighted
scoring rule, we need to check the results with a different and more
'objective' performance scoring rule. Here, a second measure of team
performance may be defined by considering the actual numeric (instead
of the rank ordered) performance results for the objectives. To derive
a simple composite score, the numeric performance results for each objective
can be first normalized by comparing against the results obtained for
all teams; i.e. by subtracting the group mean and then dividing by the
standard deviation. The normalized scores are then averaged over all
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objectives to obtain the composite score. Thus, for example, if a team
had average performance on each objective, it would receive a score
of zero. We will define this performance measure as the 'objective
performance score' since it is the most neutral way of scoring using the
set of given objectives, (i.e. it disregards the teams' preferences
on objectives but weights everything equally.)
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IV. Results
Although the teams were allowed to change the weights on objectives
during the initial moves of the game, the data obtained from the four
groups show no specific pattern of changes in the way teams reset the
weightings (e.g. there was no indication that the weightings became
more focussed or diverse as objectives were changed) . Nor was there
any specific pattern as to how the teams within a group might favor
the same objectives. In two groups, AGP I and SEP II, different teams
within each group placed emphasis on different objectives, following a
more or less random distribution. In one group, i.e. AGP II, the ma-
jority of teams tended to emphasize two objectives, ROA and NI. In gen-
eral, no extraneous circximstances were found that might bias the results
obtained, as siommarized by Table 4. The high correlation found between
the actual performance score and the objective score (r = 0.92) also
ao
checks the performance scoring rule used in this study.
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Table 4 - Summary of Results
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Table 4 Suimnary of Results (Continue)
Variables Pearson Correlation Significance
Actual Performance Score 0.92 ^ ,01
with Objective Performan-
ce Score: r
ao
Actual Performance Score -0.45 ^ .015
with Index of Diversity r
,
ad
Actual Performance Score 0.52 ^ .01
with Index of Consistency r
ac
Index of Diversity -0.54 < .01
with Index of Consis-
tency r,
d c
Partial Correlations;
r
,
= -.40
ad. c
r , = .37
ac.d
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A. Focussed vs Diverse Modes of Objective Setting
The results in Table 4 show that, in generaj., the teams
that have adopted more focussed objectives tended to have better per-
formance results. Specifically, there is a significant negative corre-
lation between the index of objective diversity and performance score
(r ^ = -0.45, p < .015)
ad '^
Observation of team decision making processes and analysis
of their performances, as well as information obtained from the teams'
orally presented self-analysis at the end of each game indicate that teams
with focussed objectives tended to evolve different decision making styles
from teams with diverse objectives. The teams that had focussed objectives
tended to employ a more centralized, top-down, policy oriented decision
making structure. In contrast, the teams with diverse objectives tended
to employ a bottom-up, functionally oriented decision making structure.
Many of the latter teams' period-to-period operational decisions were
dominated by the opinions of different functional experts within the
teams (e.g. the person responsible for marketing or forecasting) and
apparently often without much scrutiny of the teams' overall decision
making objectives. In general, it appears that the adoption of focussed
objectives facilitated the strategic management process for the teams
by imposing greater policy constraints, but also led to considerations
of fewer alternatives; i.e. when decisions had to be made, some options
were readily excluded because they were deemed to be not in line with the
teams' objectives and strategy. On the other hand, many of the other
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teams that had established diverse objectives never succeeded in zeroing
in on ciny sort of clear cut strategy. The significant correlation foxind
between objective setting and performance thus suggests that the teams
which had adopted more focussed objectives were better able to achieve
their operational goals and desired performance results via the evolve-
ment of more top-down policy oriented decision making structure; whereas the
teams which had adopted more diverse objectives were more apt to shift
strategies but often failed to achieve their desired performance results.
B. Consistency between Objectives and Performance Results
The results from Table 4 show a significant positive
correlation between performance and the index of consistency (r = 0.52,
p < .01) . It should- be noted here that the index of consistency, unlike
the measure on objective diversity (which was established at the
initial part of each game competition), is a posterior measure; i.e.
it does not measure directly whether a team might have been consistent
or not in the actual pursuit of established objectives during the course
of the game. Rather, the easier question for statistical inference here
is that: are teams that do well in the game competition also more
consistent between their objectives and results (and the converse relation-
ship for teams that had poor performances) ? The evidence obtained
here remains significant if we had used the objective performance score
instead of the actual performance score (r = .33, p < .06).
oc
The statistical evidence is also supported by observa-
tions during the games, as well as by questionnaire responses from the
game participants. In general, the game participants did perceive
inconsistency in decision making as a key factor that led to poor
performance. As measured by the returned questionnaires from the two AGP
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groups (Appendix I & II) . 75% of AGPI and 88% of AGP II agreed that
inconsistency was a key factor affecting performance. (See Table 5
for a summary of the two questionnaire responses)
.
In the teams' oral presentations at the end of the games,
the participants often readily acknowledged certain inconsistencies in
their decision making. At other times, the inconsistency issue was
more subtle. Obviously, they always thought that they were being
consistent at the time of the decisions, but the difference was in the
analysis performed (or the absence thereof) . Teams typically created
different future sceneries in planning. What was often missing, however,
was an assessment of the probability of such sceneries occuring as well
as an estimate of the cost and benefits of each sceneries. Instead,
the emotional feeling that something might occur often overshadowed
the analysis of decisions and their consistency with expressed policy.
It appears that it was often in this respect that the teams with focussed
objectives and policy driven decision making organizational structure
succeeded in having a large picture and a closer scrutiny of the strategic
decision making process.
C. Individual Contribution and Interaction Effects of Objective Setting
and Consistency on Performance
The above results show that both objective diversity and
consistency are correlated with performance. In addition, we also found
a significant correlation between objective diversity and consistency.
Thus, it is worthwhile to examine further the individual contribution ef-
Iccts (»r ubjccl Ivf dLvf<r;illy .uwl ((jrir: i fit t'tit^y on | .c- 1 I < irniniii •r< . 'I'll'- | m r II n I
correlation between actual performance and objective divers iveness, con-
trolling for consistency (i.e. r ) equals -0.40; and the partial
3iCl • C
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correlation between actual performance and consistency, controlling for
objective diversity (i.e. r J is computed to be 0.30. Thus, it ap-ace
pears that both objective diversity and consistency have a similar re-
lationship with performance. A two-way analysis of mean team performance
score by the two factors of objective setting and consistency, as shown
in Table 5, also indicates the two factors contribute about equally to-
wards performance and shows no evidence of interaction effect.
Table 5. Mean Performance Scores of Teams by
Two-Way Comparison of Objective
Diversity and Consistency
High Focus
(Low Diver-
sity)
(d = 0,1,2)
Low Focus
(High Diver-
sity)
(d = 3,4)
High Con-
sistency
C a .2
Low Con-
sistency
C < .2
Mean Performance
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D. Effect of Group Characteristics and the Requirement of Formal
Planning and Policy Formulation on Game Performance
In the present study, we are also interested in investi-
gating whether the requirement for formal planning and policy statements from
game participeints made any differences in team performcinces, aind whether group
characteristics might have entered as an intervening variable. From the
results shown in Table 4, we find no noticeable differences in the general
patterns of objective setting and consistency measures between the AGP
students and the SEP business executives. Nor could we find the require-
ment for formal planning and policy statements to lead to more focussed
objectives or greater consistency. However, in order to make valid
comparisons between overall team performances in different groups, we
cannot use either the actual performance score or the objective score
since they both measure relative performance within each group. A more
meaningful cross-group comparison of performance would be in terms of
actual game performance measures such as sales, net earnings and market
value, as shown in Table 7. But, again, the data failed to show any
significant differences in these performance factors for the
four groups.
The above finding appears to be somewhat contrary to
what might be expected in light of the other results, i.e. explicit planning
and policy statements might be expected to lead to better focus on goals
and greater consistency in decision making, and thus better performance
as well. One relevant question we can raise first is the perceived
usefulness of the Planning and Policy Forms by the game participants.
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These data were obtained via questionnaires as well as through informal
discussions with game participants in groups AGP I (who did not have the
forms during their game) and AGP II (who used the forms) . The
questionnaires and responses are shown in Appendix 1 & 2. The results
from these returns are summarized in Table 6. The data show that while
both a significant majority of people in both groups (88% in AGP I
and 62% in AGP II) indicate that they would, (if given the option)
,
recommend their team to use the forms in spite of the time and effort
required (a significant 'cost' in terms of the compressed time
allowance between game decisions), there is also the noticeable drop
in enthusiasm about the Planning Forms from AGP I to AGP II. In
addition, while 84% of the people in AGP I felt that the use of such
forms would lead to better planning and performance, a significantly
lower percentage of people (54%) in AGP II thought they probably did.
The explanation for this difference in enthusiasm was
found in the comments that many AGP II participants appended in their
questionnaires as well as from informal discussions with the students.
Many participants in this group viewed the forms as bureaucratic red-
tape rather than as something that would serve a decision support
purpose (e.g. "just another form to fill out for the game administrators").
Thus , while most of the participants agree in retrospect that the forms
could have been very useful potentially as a basis of group discussion
on policy, strategy and planning, many did not find them useful during
the game. And, given that planning and policy formulation requirements
probably did not achieve their intended organizational decision making
support purpose, the lack of significant results on performance was not
surprising.
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Table 6 Summary of (Postgame) Questionnaire Responses on Desirability
and Effect of Formal Planning
Question
PlanninR is bett<»r than
diagnostic decision
Making
Inconsistencies is a
key factor that led to
poor performances
Would recommend own
team to use the planning
forms
Believe forms would lead
to better planning &
performances
Forms did lead to better
planning & performances
j
i--
Group
AGP I
AGP II
AGP I
AGP II
AGP I
AGP II
AGP I
AGP II
Agree
80%
81%
75%
88%
88%
62%
84%
54%
Response
ki
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Table 7. Cross Croup Comparison of Garae Performance Results
A. AGP I vs AGP II
AGP I (Without Formal Planning Requirement)
Factor (Units)
Avg. Promotional + R & D
Expenses ($10"
)
14
597
15
603
Quarter
16 17
611 673
18
681
19
627
Total
3792
Avg. Sales-Domestic (10 Units)
3
Avg. Sales-Foreign (10 Units)
3
Avg. Earnings ($10 )
Avg. Mkt. Value ($10^;
551
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Table 7 (Continue)
B. SEP I vs SEP II
SEP I (Without Formal Planning Requirement)
Quarter
Factor (Units) M 1^ 16 17 18 19 Total
Avg. Promotional + R & D
Expenses ($10^) 633.3 70^.8 746 812 923 1,026 4,346.1
Avg. Sales-Domestic(10\nits) 559.4 649 528.8 574.2 626.6 85;L.7 3,-7-89.7
Avg. Sales-Foreign (lO^nits) 151.7 223.5 173.3 183.5 210.48 313 1,255^5
Avg. Earnings ($10"^) 574 884 673.7 736 813 1,475 5,155.7
Avg. Mkt. Value ($10^ 17.5 18.2 20.3 23.4 27.6 42.6
SEP II (With Requirement of Formal Planning)
Quarter
Factor (Units) 14 15 16 17 18 19 Total
Promotiona!
3
Expenses ($10 )
Avg. onal + R & D
, , 536 643 698 732 791 692 4092
3
Avg. Sales-Domestic (10 Units) 518
3
Avg. Sales-Foreign (10 Units) 146
Avg. Earnings ($10 ) 525
Avg. Mkt. Value ($10^) 17./
705
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V. Conclusion
In this study, we suggested the use of multi-dimensional
performance scoring rule as a potentially effective mechanism for
providing feedback to game participants about the goal formulation,
policy and planning aspects of group decision making. By evaluating
each team's decision inputs from this perspective, more insight can be
gained about the dynamics and causal «iffects of organizational deci-
sion making, and thus making the gaming exercise a more meaningful
educational experience for the participants. The use of the multi-
dimensional performance score in this study was checked by its high
correlation with another objective performance measure.
The major results obtained in this study indicate that
the role of objectives and consistencies in group decision making were
significant factors that affect performance. Specifically, teams with
more focussed objectives tended to have better performances in the
gaming competitions. It was observed that the adoption of more focussed
objectives by a team had certain implications for the decision making
process that evolved; i.e. they tended to lead to more centralized,
policy-driven, top-down organizational structure which facilitated the
group decision making process, but generally with considerations of
fewer alternatives. In addition, the successful teams in the gaining
competitions also showed greater consistencies between their objectives
and performance results. Questionnaire responses from two groups also
indicated that a great majority of game participants perceived inconsistency
to be a key factor affecting game performance.
No differences were found in the results for the masters
student groups and the business executive groups. There was also no
evidence of any improvements in the performance results or observable
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Appendix 1: Questionnaire for Ac;f I Game I'ait ic i p.iut s .uul Uisponso
(N=25)
MEMO TO: AGP Students
FROM: Denis Lee
DATE: May 1, 1975
I am in the process of doing a research study on strategic decision
maki.ig using the MIT Management Game. (A draft of my paper will be avail-
able for anyone who might be interested). I hope to get your assistance
in filling out the following short questionnaire:
Please answer the following Questions -
1) The formulation of longer term strategy, based on the team's goals and
objectives and their implications, would lead to better performances
than the use of more diagnositc, short-term, opportunities oriented
decision making.
n '^ Q lA 5
strongly disagree neutral agree strongly
disagree agree
2) Inconsistencies in decision making is a key factor that leads to poor
performances
.
n 6 15 3 1
strongly disagree neutral agree strongly No Response
disagree agree
Please read the attached Planning and Policy Statement which is designed
to vise with the Game, and then answer the following two questions -
3) In general, our team (Team// ) did/did not (please cross out one)
follow an explicit strategy and policy formulation similar to the detail
suggested here. did 10
did not 13
no response 2
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Appendix 1 (Continue)
4) I feel that the use of such explicit strategy and policy formulation
would lead to better performance for our team.
.Q-
strongly
disagree
J_ 12
disagree neutral agree strongly
agree
5) Given the extra time and effort required in filling out the forms and
discussion amongst team members, I don't feel our team would want to
use it.
12
strongly
disagree
disagree neutral agree strongly no response
agree
6) I would recommend my team to use such a form.
17
strongly
disagree
disagree neutral agree strongly
agree
Name: (Optional)
Thank you,
Please return comj-leted questionnaire to my mai'' folder.

Appendix 2: Questionnaire for AGP II Game Participants (N=26)
MEMO TO: AGP STUDENTS
FROM: DENIS LEE
DATE: 8-22-75
I am in the process of doing a research study on strategic decision making
using the MIT Management Game. (A draft of my paper will be available later for
anyone who might be interested). I hope to get your assistance in filling out the
following short questionnaire:
1) The formulation of longer term strategy, based on the team's goals and objectives
and their implications, would lead to better performances than the use of more diag-
nostic, short-term, opportunities oriented toward decision making.
1 2 2 10 11
STRONGLY DISAGREE NEUTRAL AGREE STRONGLY
DISAGREE AGREE
2) Inconsistencies in decision making is a key factor that leads to poor performances.
M ? ] _L2 1_L
STRONGLY DISAGREE NEUTRAL AGREE STRONGLY
DISAGREE AGREE
I would also like to get your opinion specifically about the usefulness of the Planning
& Policy Statement in aiding your team's decision making.
3) I feel that the use of such explicit strategy and policy formulation did lead
to better planning and probably higher performance as well.
2 5 5 8 6
STRONGLY DISAGREE NEUTRAL AGREE STRONGLY
DISAGREE AGREE
4) Given the time and effort required in filling out the forms and discussion
amongst team members, I would not recommend my team use them, given the option.
Q 7 5 5
STRONGLY DISAGREE NEUTRAL AGREE STRONGLY
DISAGREE AGREE
DL:ben

Appendix 3. Planning and Policy Forms
The Process of Strategic Planning
1. The first otep in planning is, of course, setting up your priorities
on long-term objectives . This involves assigning relative weights to
four measures of performance (see Firm Goal Questionnaire):
market share
market value (stock price x shares outstanding)
return on assets
net earnings
The weights you assign obviously determine your overall strategy
in the Game. You are required to fill out the Firm Goal Questionnaire
before the game begins. However, you will have a chance to revise this
after the first two moves.
2. Having specified your long-term objectives, you need to identify how
your own decisions, environmental factors and competitive actions all in-
fluence the performance indices (and hence, yourlong-term objectives).
The planner's job thus may be viewed as building and testing hypotheses
about two sets of relationships:
a) Environmental factors, such as Industry demand
b) Functional relationships between decisions and environmental
variables
A. Environmental Variables
The main environmental factor to be analyzed and explained is, of
course. Industry demand. You will need to build a conceptual model of
demand in the form:
Demand = f (GNP, industry advertising, industry pricing. . .R&D)
f (x,y) means is a function of x and y
REGR, the tim i-shared regression package may be of immense help here.
However, well before you use REGR you need to build your mental model.
One of the worst mistakes that can be made in using multivariate analyti-
cal techniques like regression is to use it for "data-dredging", to
randomly try combinations of variables in the hope that they will somehow
give you "the" answer. You must have a coherent theory of the market:
regression, in a way, merely tests yoyr theory and helps you adjust it.

Appendix 3 (Continue)
B. Functional Relationships
A few, by no means all, examples are given below of functional
relationships. These relationships try to link decisions (controllable)
with environmental factors (non-controllable but forecastable) to en-
able you to maximize a performance objective. For example (again the
illustration is only hypothetical)
:
Market share = f (Unit sales, total demand)
Unit sales f (Price relative to competitors. Promotion, R&D,
available inventory, brand loyalty)
Demand is non-couitrollable but forecastable; the planner needs to develop
an estimate of the relative impact on sales of a price cut or increase,
advertising level, etc.
4. Of course, the set of interacting relationships in the Game are
very complex and it is unlikely you can accurately identify them all.
Moreover, the payoff from doing so might be small. In you planning,
you essentially need to develop a general insight into the main dynamics
of the Game and a selective analysis in more detail of key relationships.
In addition, you need to coordinate and integrate the various components
of your planning, obviously there may be occasions when you marketing and
production plans are mutually incompatible. As a means to helping you
in this coordination and to ensure that you review your short-term deci-
sions in relation to your long-term objectives, you will be required to
submit a Policy Statement every two moves (Q14, 16, and 18). In addi-
tion, you should submit forecasts and a brief review of your current
activities with each move. These forms are shown in the next pages.

Appendix 3 (Continue)
POLICY STATEMENT Quarter
[Due Q14, Q16, £. Q18] _
Team
Part A
We have assigned the following weights for our long-term objectives:
.
Market value Q19
Market share Q19
Average earnings Q14-Q19
Average return of assets Q14-Q19
We have considered the performance indices that are central to achieving
these objectives to be:
Market Value
Market Share
Earnings
Return on
Assets
Our general strategy will be:
How would you evaluate your perfc nuance in relation to your strategy
over the last two moves?
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Part B
1. Describe any models or general equations you have developed for
forecasting.
2. Describe your assumptions and policies in the following areas:
a) Pricing
assumptions about importance/impact of pricing:
policy
:
b) Promotion
assumptions about impact of promotional effects;
policy:
c) R&D
assumptions about impact of R & D:
policy:
d) Summary of overall Marketing Strategy
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Appendix 3 (Continue)
Part B (continued)
e) Summary of Production and Inventory Strategy
f) Summary of Labor and Plant Expansion Strategy
g) Summary of Cash Management Strategy
h) Summary of Stock Strategy
i) Surrmary of Overall Financial Strategy
Dm
T-J5 143 w no.886- 76
Stangle, Bruce/The determinants of sys
730047,7. P'B^S
^"'^^1/1^
II
3 iOaO DOO 7TS fll2
T-J5 143 w no.887- 76
Lee Denis Mm/Strategic decision maki
7300497 A*P.!S5, M}: .UL
llinil|lll|!l| I ill
3 TDSQ 000 7TS 7Tt.
T-J5 143 w no.888- 76
Barouch, Eytan/Oil and gas d^iscovery
m
73005.1 7 , p»BKS „„ „ ,,M,Q?, n^,?,,tii|||
3 TD60 DO 7T5 7b2
T-J5 143 w no.889- 76
Schein, Edgar /Increased organizationa
730421 D»BKS 00P32842
11
3 TOflO 000 flOT 373

